madeinatlantis LONDON TRAVEL GUIDE STRATEGIC GEOGRAPHY - GREAT BRITAIN THERE now remain for consideration what we may describe as the dynamical aspects of British geography. Every civilised nation is related in two ways to the land which it occupies. Whatever the exchanges effected by trading, it is (1) ultimately dependent upon the past and present produce of its own territory, and (2) it must be prepared to defend that territory against the intrusion of covetous neighbours. The two groups of ideas involved may be roughly indexed under the terms economic and strategic. We may describe economic geography as concerned with the raising and distribution of commodities, and strategic geography as dealing with the larger topographical conditions of offence and defence. But the problems to be solved are closely inter-related, for defence is essentially the protection of the means of economic subsistence; and the distribution of products, being conducted in chief measure along lines of least resistance, follows and prepares the paths of strategic opportunity. Nor can the two studies be made applicable respectively to peace and to war, for never are economic resources more anxiously reviewed than when war is impending, while the pressure of strategical considerations is urgent upon governments at all times, since diplomacy has been well described as the banking system of sovereigns, whereby they draw upon their respective potentialities of offence and defence, and adjust differences without unsheathing the sword. The defence of Britain rests fundamentally upon the theory implied in the command of the sea. This expression is not meant to convey any claim of sovereignty on the high seas beyond the gunshot zone along the coast. Such a claim was formerly made by England, and at times was acquiesced in by other states, probably with a view to the easier suppression of piracy. In a military sense, however, a Power has command of the sea, as against another Power with which it is at war, when it has destroyed the enemy's fleet or securely blockaded it, and has thus carried the national frontier for the purpose of the war, and for that purpose only, to the enemy's coast. Had Britain obtained command of the sea in a war, say, with France, the effect would be to carry the British frontier to the coast of France, and to add the Channel to Britain as a part of the globe within which the commanding Power could prepare attack against the enemy. This command, even when complete as against the enemy, would be limited by the rights of neutrals. But it is clear that under such circumstances England would be safe from invasion by sea, and France would be liable to it; hence the expression that the navy is Britain's shield, and the army her spear. The enemy's coasts are the utmost limit of sea power, whose final office is to give freedom in the selection of the point at which to deliver an attack with land forces. Had France, on the other hand, obtained command of the sea, the conditions would be reversed. France would move freely in the Channel, and would deliberately choose her anchorage for the invasion of Britain. Viewed from this standpoint, the defence of Britain resolves itself into three problems: (1) the retention of the command of the sea, or rather, of the power of taking that command should occasion demand it; (2) the defence of Great Britain should the command of the sea be temporarily lost; and (3) the separate defence of Ireland in the same contingency, for under such a condition the prompt and certain reinforcement of the army in Ireland would not be practicable. If the enemy's command of the sea were complete, all the shores of Britain would in theory be threatened equally, and the task of their defence against a raid almost hopeless. Practically, however, owing to the limited radius of action of modern fleets, which must periodically replenish their supplies of fuel, the regions of Britain most threatened are those about the continental angle and the Channel entries. The position of the Metropolis, and the paralysing blow which its seizure would imply, give added importance to the defence of the former region. As regards the latter, it must be observed that the isolation of Ireland, although weakening the United Kingdom by an additional problem of defence, allows of an alternative approach from the Western Ocean to Liverpool and Glasgow, in a quarter remote from Brest and Corunna. The great traffic passing from the south-west up the English, the Bristol, and the St. George's Channels might be diverted to the North Channel, should circumstances make that course desirable. All the chief bases' of naval action lie within Metropolitan England, near the shores, that is to say, of the Narrow Seas. Chatham, Sheerness, Portsmouth, and Devonport are the dockyards; they stand opposite to the Rhine mouths, to Cherbourg; and to Brest. Harbours of refuge lie between them at Portland, at Dover, and at Harwich. The great naval arsenal is at Woolwich; the naval schools are at Dartmouth, Portsmouth, and Greenwich. Walmer, on the coast of Kent, is the depôt of the marines, and the three divisions of the marines ashore are stationed at Chatham, Portsmouth, and Devonport. The dockyards of Pembroke in Wales, and Queenstown in the south of Ireland, are the only important naval stations beyond the limits of Metropolitan England, and their position has an obvious bearing on the defence of the ocean roads where they enter the St. George's and the Bristol Channels. The four English dockyards serve not merely for the construction of new ships and for repairs, but are also the refitting bases of the Channel Fleet and the stations of the reserve. The great private yards for the construction of men-of-war are free from these strategical considerations, and therefore more naturally placed in Industrial England and in Scotland -- on the Tyne, at Barrow, and on the Clyde. At Cardiff is available the world's chief supply of smokeless fuel. The exercise ground of the navy, on the other hand, is often to the west of Ireland, clear of the steam lanes of commerce, in waters where seamanship may be learned in oceanic weather. Here a remarkable series of havens. gives abundant shelter -- Loughs Foyle and Swilly, Blacksod and Clew Bays, Dingle Bay, Kenmare River, and Bantry Bay (Berehaven). If Britain were for a time to lose the command of the seas, these harbours on the remote edge of the land, away from all the great centres of population, might become nests of hostile cruisers. As with the navy, so with the army, the preparations for the defence of Great Britain are chiefly concentrated within Metropolitan England, for the purpose of protecting from sudden descents London, the brain of the Empire, and the naval bases. To some extent, also, military force is present in the Metropolis as an ultimate sanction of the power of the government and for the reinforcement of the police. The centres of the mobile army in England are at Aldershot and on Salisbury Plain, on the flank of an enemy's line of march from the south coast to London, and in a position to relieve Portsmouth and to repel attack either from the Devonian Peninsula or the Bristol Channel. They are convenient, moreover, for the shipment of an army going over seas from Southampton, London, and Bristol. Colchester is the prepared basis for the defence of the Metropolis from attack on the east. Dover, Chatham, Portsmouth, and Devonport have garrisons, but Portsmouth is probably the only first-class British fortress, as the expression would be understood on the Continent. There is a small garrison at Portland, and there are large depôts at Winchester and Canterbury. There are Guards at Windsor, and Cavalry at Hounslow, in the western outskirts of London. Woolwich is the chief station of the Artillery, and Chatham of the Engineers. At Woolwich, Sandhurst, and Camberley are the institutions for military education. At Waltham and Enfield on the Lea are the factories of explosives and small arms, and at Pimlico the clothing factory. In Industrial England and in Scotland there are military centres at York and at Edinburgh; but the troops stationed in these districts remote from the Continent are but a few thousand for recruiting purposes and for the support of the police. They consist usually of regiments lately returned from foreign service, whereas those preparing to go abroad are concentrated at Aldershot and on Salisbury Plain. As in the case of the Navy, there are private works in Industrial England which form an ultimate reserve for the manufacture of weapons. In Ireland the location of the military forces is analogous to that in the greater island, and for somewhat similar reasons. Strategy in Ireland turns necessarily on Dublin, and on the roads in rear of the Wicklow mountains which communicate between Dublin, on the one hand, and Waterford and Cork on the other. The chief military station, apart from Dublin, is the Curragh, the Irish Aldershot, near Kildare on the Liffey, where the roadways branch which lead down the valley of the Barrow to Waterford, and across the plains of Queen's County and Tipperary to Cork and Limerick. Most of the remaining troops are distributed among a number of small stations within and about the triangle Waterford -Limerick -- Cork. In the north and west are but a few scattered units, comparable to those commanded from York and Edinburgh, which are utilised for recruiting purposes, and occasionally for the reinforcement of the constabulary. Thus the same contrast between the south-east and the north-west which characterises almost every other aspect of British geography is to be found also in its strategic geography, except in so far as this is modified by the separate insularity of Ireland and the importance of the oceanic antechamber to the south-west. The effective forces are within and about the continental angle, but the reserves of men and constructive power, both military and naval, are distributed through Industrial England, Scotland, and Ireland.		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